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ABSTRACT
At this time social planning has come to be synonymous with
technical forecasting. Because of this trend, the methods used
by social planners are those of positive science. These methods,
however, are not self-reflective, and are therefore naive about
the epistemological assumptions which they inadvertantly advance.
As a result of this epistemological naivete, many times the social
planner is guided by methodological assumptions that are totally
incongruent with the social world to which they are to be applied.
This type of social forecasting is referred to as irresponsible
social planning, in that it is not sensitive to the needs and
values of the individuals to be surveyed. The result of this type
of technical forecasting is the development of abstract plans that
have little social relevance. In order to avoid this type of ir-
responsible planning, the social planner must be self-reflexive,
so that social planning comes to be viewed as the self-motivated
projection and monitoring of social desires. This type of self-
motivated planning is non-repressive and indicative of legitimate
social management, and is the hallmark of the rational society.
Only can social planning facilitate the growth of human rationality
when it is guided by self-motivated goals.
At this time the idea of "applied sociology" is receiving
more and more attention by sociologists. This concept of "applied
sociology" has assumed many variegated meanings. For example, to
some sociologists the label "applied" is attached to those
sociologists who earn their living in non-academic settings,
while to others a sociologist is of the applied variety when he/
she employs the methods and knowledge accumulated by the discipline
of sociology to solve or remedy a particular social problem. What
both of these particular examples embody, however, is a differen-
tiation that is either implicitly or explicitly present when the
issue of applied sociology is discussed. That is, most all dis-
cussions of applied sociology make the distinction between pure
theory and applied research, in that the applied sociologist is
thought to no longer deal with pure theory, but instead is believed
to be oriented toward more practical or real issues. This conclu-
sion, however, leads to many serious misunderstandings, particularly
when the idea of applied sociology is thought to be similar inin-
tention to what is meant by the idea of social engineering.
Social Engineering and Human Freedom
The process of social engineering usually carries connotations
of serious finality. The social engineer, because of his/her belief
in absolute rationality, is thought to suppress social spontaneity.
This is particularly the case when the social engineer uses the
scientific method to determine social policy through the implemen-
tation of rigorous research strategies. This more "objective"
procedure for regulating social activities is thought to deprive
the social individual of his/her volitional capacity, thus resulting
in the sterile unfolding of an artificially developed collective
destiny. Modern technological development is usually viewed as the
paragon of this type of social planning. Understood in this con-
text, the intentions of the applied sociologist are many times
thought to be highly suspect.
Why, however, is it the case that systematic planning has come
to be associated with repressive activities? Why has the idea of
planning itself come to be viewed as an anti-humanistic activity?
Or even more to the point, does the process of social planning have
to be thought to compromise the freedom that is assumed to be in-
digenous to social life (Ballard, 1978; Ellul, 1964, Gorz, 1967;
Habermas, 1979). My immediate answer to this latter query is
obviously no, as should be noted from the rhetorical manner in which
it is posed. Yet this answer must be elucidated further if the
source of my conclusion is to be sufficiently clarified.
Theory and Objectivity
The origin of this confusion is the bifurcation that is thought
to exist between pure theory and applied research. According to
this typology, theory is thought to exist in some ethereal realm
that is totally divorced from the exigencies of everyday life.
Because of this it is always accorded a neutral status. Theories,
therefore, are not thought to affect the social world in any way,
but instead are understood to merely mimic what is presented as
worldly or real. The obverse of this arrangement is that what is
assumed to be worldly or real is viewed to be an inherent property
of the world. The goal of scientific inquiry then is to somehow
align a worldly fact to the theory which adequately explains it.
Throughout this alignment.activity it is never believed that theory
orients any search for facts, in that the presuppositions of any
particular theory might actually define what eventually comes to be
viewed as factual.
Of course, the aforementioned portrayal of the bifurcation that
is thought to exist between theory and practice is somewhat exag-
gerated, yet my point should be clear. That is, when it is not
thought that theory shapes the world-view held by the planner, the
so-called scientific view of the social planner may in fact labor
to outline a planning option that is of no relevance to a particular
community. This is simply due to the fact that the social planner
might be inadvertantly advancing assumptions about what is thought
to be relevant social action that are not at all similar to those
held by the individuals to which all subsequent planning policies
are to be applied.
What is the upshot of the scenario that is depicted in the
foregoing paragraph? Stated simply, a supposedly neutral activity,
or theory, is thought to discover through its explanatory power
a similarly neutral social fact. How does this rendition of the
relationship of theory to facticity outline the social position
of the individual relative to the scientific application of socio-
logical theory? In a word, the intentions of the social individual
are essentially usurped of their power through the presence of
both a neutral activity and a factual world to which he/she has
no essential relationship. In the parlance of this so-called
scientific enterprise, the individual is merely subjective, while
both theory and facticity are provided the seigneural status of
being objective. The terms of such a relationship demand that primacy
be given to the objective component (Frankl, 1967; Gadamer, 1976;
Marcuse, 1968; Simonds, 1978). The individual is therefore evi-
cerated as a result of this relationship to the point of lifeless-
ness.
Whose Reality?
In terms of the assumptions of the scientific enterprise, the
ability to relate to the world circumscribed by that activity is
incumbent upon the extent to which the reality of the social indi-
vidual is congruent with the scientific world-view. If the world-
view held by a society is not grounded in positive science, it is
highly likely that those persons will be alienated from the re-
sulting world which scientific theory demands. As Heidegger suggests
(1971), at this time not many people orient their lives according
to the meanings advanced by positive science. A similar belief is
advanced by writers such as O'Neill (1974) and Luckmann (1978). It
is no wonder, therefore, that applied sociology, when attempting to
facilitate social planning through the use of its theories and
methods, is viewed as a highly oppressive and, thus, stultifying
activity. Sociological theory and method, as a result of their
attempt to emulate the positive scientific approach of physics, do
not really describe the world as it is lived by most actors. In
a word, positive science substitutes a particular view of the world
for the entire world horizon. As a result of this, the application
of sociology inadvertantly denies the existence of the social life
which it purports to be investigating. Because rational planning,
likewise, is associated with scientifically motivated thinking, the
idea of planning itself comes to be synonymous with the denial of
social existence.
Modern social theory, that which is particularly associated with
the movement referred to as hermeneutic philosophy, recognizes that
the idea of a-historical objectivity is itself highly problematic.
To be specific, such a thought would result in the simultaneous
denial of that a-historical phenomenon. Due to the fact that all
meanings must be worldly (historical), in that they possess para-
meters that are relational by nature, theory must be viewed as the
process through which all meanings are mediated or brought to
prominence. In a word, theory does not merely serve to outline an
"objective" set of relationships, but instead is an integral part
of the process whereby social/structural relations are established
(Apel, 1980; Husserl, 1964; Scheler, 1980; Schroyer, 1970). Be-
cause of this, theory does not merely provide a descriptive function,
but in direct contrast to this actually serves to construct meaning
relationships, or to make their interconnection thematic.
A New Image of Social Planning
However, how does this shift in viewing theory and, thus,
"objectivity" affect the idea of applied sociology? If applied
sociology were to ever be used to provide evidence for the pur-
pose of policy making, how would this modern rendition of social
theory affect this process? Since the concept of positive objec-
tivity is essentially denied by this recent shift in understanding
theory, policy formation itself must be understood to be a part of
the social process, instead of merely being viewed to be the rational
necessity or outgrowth of a social destiny assumed to possess legiti-
macy sui generis. Accordingly, social policy does not merely facili-
tate world development, but much more fundamentally actually shapes
the destiny of the social world. The world and, therefore, the de-
velopment of the world must be thought to be a truly social activity.
Social engineering, moreover, must come to be viewed as self-
management, as is outlined by modern Yugoslavian sociologists (Horvat,
Markovic, and Supek, 1975; Sher, 1977). As Markovic illustrates, the
application of sociology in the form of self-management requires that
the social world adopt a renewed version of what it means to engage
in social planning. No longer, as is the case with positive science,
is the efficient development of an already sedimented social structure
thought to be the goal of social planning. Likewise, predictions
based on the possible growth of an assumed legitimate social reality,
formulated for the purpose of effective social adjustment, are not
supposed to be the major product of social planning. Rather, the
major product of social planning is to be the formulation or con-
stitution of a popularly supported, i.e., historically constituted,
course of social action, and subsequent to this the evaluation of
the extent to which those historically developed plans have been
achieved. Because this entire planning process is thought to be a
social product, any plan can be altered or abandoned at any time by
the persons involved in the planning process. The unfolding of any
particular social plan must therefore be understood to be the result
of the motivations and interests of the social participants. Self-
motivated social planning is believed to be true social engineering,
in that a society monitors its own developmental progress, instead
of merely attempting to invent methods which will insure that a
society will be capable of adjusting to a set of social demands
that are not necessarily relevant.
Examples of Irresponsible Epistemology
In terms of making social planning non-repressive, what is
needed is a responsible epistemology. A responsible epistemology
is one which realizes that planning cannot be logically removed
from interpretation, and therefore a planner must be fully aware
of the "epistemological grid" (Foucault) that underpins any social
world when social planning is initiated. At this time, however, the
development of a real sensitivity to the epistemological assumptions
indigenous to social planning does not appear to be of significant
importance to social planners. A few examples should help to clarify
what I mean by this statement, thus hopefully illustrating the con-
sequences of an irresponsible epistemology.
At this time, for example, a federally funded method of program
evaluation is being used to collect data that is totally inconsistent
with the treatment philosophy of the programs to be evaluated (Murphy,
1979a). To be specific, most drug rehabilitation programs in the
United States, which by definition operate according to an out-patient
treatment philosophy, are being evaluated in terms of criteria which
have been traditionally viewed as appropriate for the evaluation of
in-patient treatment facilities. That is, it is currently the policy
of the Government to treat a client in a federally funded drug program
as successfully treated only if he/she is formally discharged from a
program. However, according to an out-patient treatment philosophy a
client may in fact be viewed as cured if the supportive counseling
offered by an out-patient clinic allows the individual to function
adequately in the community. In a word, formal discharge from an
out-patient clinic is not a prerequisite for a client to be viewed
as successfully treated. Yet if a client does remain in treatment
in an out-patient clinic, while functioning adequately in the community,
that client will never be counted as successfully treated, except,
maybe, when the clinic is finally closed and all clients must be
discharged.
The result of this incongruence between treatment and evalua-
tion philosophy is that the effectiveness of out-patient drug pro-
grams is seriously underestimated. Even though a successfully
functioning client who is in treatment will eventually be detected
when a clinic is finally closed, such a review policy is not going
to help such a clinic secure funds for future operation, at least
while that program is operating. Such a planning technique is hardly
consistent with the notion of rational planning, and exemplifies
irresponsible epistemology.
Another example of the current incongruence between planning
and social reality can be discovered in the manner in which many
social service programs are managed. Specifically, there is cur-
rently a total inconsistency between the management philosophies
that are used in most social service programs and, for example, the
philosophy underpinning the ability of the program evaluator to
collect data systematically in those programs (Murphy, 1979b). It
is well known that if an evaluator is to collect data in a systematic
and, thus, valid manner, the evaluator must be capable of building
extensive information networks throughout an organization. Yet
most social service programs are organized in the typical bureau-
cratic manner, a la Weber. The result of this is that the program
evaluator does not possess the organizational latitude to construct
the intimate information networks that must be developed if valid
information is to be collected.
The problem here is that many administrators do not take seriously
organizational and management theory, and because of this do not
really understand how that type of theory works to shape the atmos-
phere of an organization. Because of this, these administrators have
not begun to understand that the serious problem pertaining to the
underutilization of program evaluation generated data may be a manage-
ment and not a research problem, in that the organization has not
been properly prepared to foster the type of organizational environ-
ment in which program evaluation can be effectively operationalized.
Likewise, many evaluators believe that program evaluation research
should not be affected by organizational issues, because of its sup-
posedly "value neutral" nature, and therefore do not concern themselves
with the problem of integrating management and evaluation theory, so
that both of these components of a program's operation can function at
an optimal level. Much irrelevant data can be generated merely due
to this incongruency existing between evaluation and management theory.
As a result, social planning is quite haphazard.
One last example should render this issue of responsible epis-
temology perfectly clear. In the field of drug abuse, program planning
is grounded in the needs assessment. The needs assessment question-
naire, for the most part, is not used to conduct these needs assess-
ments due to cost limitations and the logistical difficulties which
are present when attempting to survey an addict population. There-
fore, most evaluators choose to use a particular form of indirect
indicator to assess the prevalence of heroin use in a community.
This indirect indicator takes the form of a variety of mathematical
projection or forecasting techniques (M1urphy, 1978). Such techniques
may be linear, non-linear, or may take the form of time series
analysis, which is supposedly able to take into account a variety of
data patterns. Nevertheless, each of these mathematical models make
major assumptions about the world that are never thoroughly investi-
gated. All an evaluator does is gather data about past drug use,
usually in the form of the number of clients who have enrolled for
treatment, and attempt to project that pattern into the future. As
with all linear and quasi-linear models, there is really no certainty
about what is meant by past behavioral performance, and subsequently
what the future is supposed to mean is pure guesswork. However,
major planning decisions are made is the field of drug abuse on data
gathered through the use of this type of social indicator, with little
or no serious attempt to assess what the data that is generated
actually means socially, as opposed to mathematically.
The point of this brief exposition portraying irresponsible
epistemology is to illustrate that theory is not irrelevant in social
planning, but instead does in fact shape the world. Accordingly,
all social planners should be ready to investigate their epistemo-
logical assumptions, so that the limitations of those assumptions
are rendered apparent, and new planning options are made manifest.
Only when this type of epistemological openness is exhibited by the
social planner will non-repressive or relevant planning take place.
Summary
In this context how must the application of sociology be under-
taken? The application of sociology must no longer be viewed as
an essentially innocuous activity. Rather, as Walter Benjamin
(1968) would say, an act of application is simultaneously an act
of interpretation (cf. Morris, 1977; Nisbet, 1976). Stated simply,
every act of application implies the presence of an existential
orientation which, by definition, might not be universal by nature.
This orientation will, likewise, outline a set of meanings and, thus,
a social destiny that cannot necessarily be thought to possess uni-
versal application or validity. If this notion is not understood by
the applied sociologist, any action on the part of the sociologist
to apply the methods and theories of that discipline to produce in-
formation to be used in making particular policy decisions will most
likely produce a highly alienating state of affairs. That is, if
the presuppositions of a particular social interpretation that is
rendered through an act of application are not verified against the
presuppositions of the social world to which that application is to
be made, then the resulting incongruency will produce either irrelevant
or oppressive social policy. Either result is inappropriate.
In order to reduce the possibility of this problem occurring
the applied sociologist must remember that the social world is a
continuous, as Simmel would say, process of socializing the world.
Therefore, any process that is worldly must be viewed as concomi-
tantly advancing and maintaining a rendition of what it means for
the world to be social. Because the application of sociology is a
worldly or historical activity, it must be remembered that it cannot
be viewed as value-neutral, but instead must be understood to form
or socialize the world through its application. If this idea is
truly comprehended by the sociologist, the process of applying socio-
logical theory and method must first include a consultation with the
social world to which all applications are to be made, so as to insure
that any application is consistent with the orieitation of that
social world. In order for the need for such a consultation activity
to be rendered apparent, a shift must be made away from the pre-
vailing attempt to assess the social fabric through the method and
theory that underpins the positive scientific approach to conducting
sociological investigations. If this shift is not made, the applica-
tion of sociologj will have little chance of overcoming the negative
connotations that are currently associated with the idea of social
engineering.
The only type of sociological application that appears to have
any future is one that recognizes that all applications must be made
within the social strictures outlined by the social reality to which
all applications are to be made. In terms of this awareness, socio-
logical application must come to be viewed as social monitoring instead
of social engineering. As such the application process serves merely
to bring a particular social orientation or reality to fruition. The
social world, therefore, becomes self-managed, instead of being
coerced into adhering to a destiny that might not be its own. It is
really only this type of self-managed application of sociological
theory and method that will result in the idea of social engineering
coming to be viewed as a benefit to social existence.
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